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NO. 34 JUNE 2020 Introduction 
Negative Sanctions and the EU’s 
External Migration Policy 
“Less for Less” Not Fit for Purpose 
David Kipp, Nadine Knapp, and Amrei Meier 
The European Commission has announced plans to present a new “Pact on Migration 
and Asylum” during the German EU Council Presidency. It is expected to provide im-
petus for the long-overdue reform of the Common European Asylum System, for the 
strengthening of the EU’s external borders, and for improved cooperation on migra-
tion policy with third countries. Many EU states see the latter as being particularly 
urgent in order to persuade countries of origin to readmit citizens who are obliged 
to leave the EU. In addition to positive incentives, sanctions against third countries 
that are unwilling to cooperate are increasingly being discussed. Although sanctions 
can have a short-term effect, they do not appear to be sustainable and can jeopardise 
more far-reaching goals of European foreign and development policy. Therefore, 
during its Presidency, Germany should instead advocate for migration policy instru-
ments that aim to achieve a long-term and fair balance of interests between the EU 
and third countries. 
 
Over the past 20 years, a common EU policy 
has developed in European border, asylum, 
and migration policy, at least in some areas. 
For a good decade, the European Commis-
sion has, for example, been able to nego-
tiate with third countries on behalf of the 
member states on the readmission of re-
jected asylum seekers and irregular migrants, 
and it has already concluded 18 agreements 
to this end. Nevertheless, the return rate 
has fallen throughout the EU in recent 
years and, according to Eurostat, stood at 
32 per cent in 2019. That means that only 
about one in three third-country nationals 
who were obliged to leave the country have 
returned to their country of origin. It is 
likely that the Commission will propose 
measures to increase the return rate within 
the framework of the announced “Pact on 
Migration and Asylum”. Apart from legal 
and administrative hurdles in the member 
states, the implementation of the obligation 
to leave the country often fails due to the 
unwillingness of third countries to take 
back their citizens. The question is how the 
readmission obligation under international 
law can be better enforced while maintain-
ing human rights standards. 
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Positive and Negative 
Conditionality 
The principle of conditionality is regarded 
as one lever to influence the behaviour of 
a state. A distinction is made between posi-
tive and negative conditionality: The former 
aims to reward a state if it fulfils the imposed 
conditions (“more for more”); the latter con-
centrates on punishing or sanctioning a 
state for the lack of – or no – cooperation, 
for example by reducing, suspending, or 
terminating benefits (“less for less”). How-
ever, the effectiveness of restrictive meas-
ures is difficult to measure and is highly 
controversial in academic discourse. 
The EU has been using the instrument 
in various policy areas for decades. For 
example, cooperation with third countries 
has been linked to political conditions such 
as the fulfilment of democratic or human 
rights standards. One important area of 
application is the EU enlargement policy, 
albeit with a mixed record: The prospect 
of EU membership could not motivate all 
accession countries to undertake sustain-
able reforms. 
Conditionality in Migration Policy 
At the end of the 2000s, the Commission 
also transferred the principle of condition-
ality to its external migration policy. It 
agreed so-called mobility partnerships, 
primarily with states in the eastern and 
southern neighbourhood. With these dia-
logue processes it aimed, among other 
things, to improve the level of cooperation 
with partner countries in the readmission 
of rejected asylum seekers or irregular 
migrants by offering the prospect of visa 
facilitation. However, this succeeded almost 
exclusively with the eastern neighbouring 
countries, but not with other states such 
as the North African partner countries 
Morocco and Tunisia. 
In the Migration Partnership Framework, 
newly established in 2016, agreements were 
reached with five more distant African coun-
tries of transit and origin, namely Niger, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, and Ethiopia. Here, 
the incentive in the form of visa facilitation 
was waived. Instead, these countries were to 
be persuaded to cooperate in the readmis-
sion of their citizens primarily by means of 
financial incentives from the newly estab-
lished EU Trust Fund (EUTF) for Africa. 
In addition, informal and legally non-
binding readmission agreements have in-
creasingly been concluded in recent years, 
namely with Afghanistan (2016), Ethiopia 
(2018), Bangladesh (2017), Côte d’Ivoire 
(2018), Guinea (2017), and Gambia (2018). 
In addition to positive incentives, in these 
cases the EU is increasingly relying on 
negative sanctions. 
Sanction 1: Reduction of 
Development Cooperation 
One lever in this respect is the reduction of 
development cooperation. However, whether 
such measures increase the readiness of 
partner countries for readmission depends 
strongly on the respective context. For 
example, at the beginning of 2018 – after 
delaying the disbursement of EUTF funds – 
the Commission succeeded in agreeing with 
Ethiopia on a legally non-binding readmis-
sion protocol. As a result, the return rate 
rose from 8 per cent in 2017 to 17 per cent 
in 2019. Afghanistan, too, agreed to im-
proved cooperation with the EU in 2016 in 
a declaration entitled “New Way Forward”. 
The EU’s implicit threat to cut financial aid, 
on which the national budget relies heavily, 
contributed to this. The new agreement 
enabled member states to significantly in-
crease return rates in 2016, from 4 per cent 
across the EU in the previous year to 28 per 
cent. 
Despite these increased rates of return, 
the EU’s action raises questions about its 
effectiveness, sustainability, and legitimacy. 
For example, if we look at the absolute 
number of returnees from EU countries to 
Ethiopia, it is striking that the number was 
only 205 in 2017 and 240 in 2019. In view 
of these small numbers, the question of 
proportionality arises. In Afghanistan, in 
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turn, after a brief increase, the return rate 
decreased again already the following year 
and was only 8 per cent in 2019 (2,370 
returnees). Deportations to Afghanistan are 
heavily criticised by both UNHCR and non-
governmental organisations due to the dev-
astating security situation on the ground. 
The example also illustrates the difficulties 
generally associated with the threat of 
negative sanctions in a fragile context: If 
financial aid is cut off in the absence of 
cooperation, this can contribute to further 
destabilisation of the country, counteract-
ing the security and development policy 
interests of the EU. 
In other cases, the leverage effect of 
European development cooperation seems 
limited. For example, negotiations on a 
readmission agreement in 2016 failed due 
to Nigeria’s lack of interest. As a result, 
a planned vocational training project 
financed by the EUTF to the tune of €50 
million was not implemented. However, 
Nigeria is not dependent on these develop-
ment funds like other countries. Other 
sources of income play a far greater role. 
On the one hand, there are remittances 
from migrants. They contribute a much 
larger share to the national budget than the 
total volume of development cooperation. 
In 2018, for example, remittances to Nigeria 
amounted to $24.3 billion, whereas public 
development cooperation funds amounted 
to only $3.3 billion. On the other hand, the 
EU is not Nigeria’s only potential partner 
for cooperation: China in particular has 
become an important economic partner 
for Nigeria in recent years. Chinese invest-
ments and construction contracts between 
2015 and 2018 were estimated at $26.7 bil-
lion. Against this background, the European 
threat to reduce development funds cannot 
generate strong pressure. 
Sanction 2: Visa Restrictions 
Another application area of negative con-
ditionality is to link readmission to EU visa 
policy. As early as 2017, the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives of the member 
states created an informal mechanism in-
tended to sanction third countries that did 
not cooperate in the readmission of migrants. 
In February 2020, it received a new legal 
basis with the amendments to the Schengen 
Visa Code. The new code stipulates that 
citizens of a country that does not cooper-
ate sufficiently with the EU in the view of 
the Commission must accept longer visa 
processing times and higher fees. 
However, it is not only unclear what 
“sufficient” cooperation will look like exactly. 
The overall effectiveness of a stricter visa 
policy must also be questioned. Visa restric-
tions have led to readmission agreements 
with Bangladesh (2017) and Côte d’Ivoire 
(2018). However, the return rate has not 
risen since then: In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, 
it has remained largely unchanged, and in 
the case of Bangladesh, it has even fallen – 
from 17 per cent (2017) to 11 per cent 
(2019). There is therefore no evidence of a 
leverage effect from the more restrictive 
visa policy. 
As a counter-example, a similar mecha-
nism already introduced in 2016 in coopera-
tion with the countries of the Western 
Balkans is often cited. Here, the threat to 
suspend visa-free travel in the absence of 
cooperation has greatly increased the num-
ber of returns. However, what makes this 
example significantly different from other 
contexts is the geographical proximity of 
the cooperation countries to the EU, the 
intensity of cooperation in other areas, and 
the prospect of EU accession as a positive 
incentive. 
In contrast, European visa requirements 
are already difficult to meet for many of the 
main African countries of origin of asylum 
seekers. Therefore, visa restrictions do not 
seem to be a particularly effective lever. 
Sanctions in Other Policy Areas 
In recent years, the Commission has 
repeatedly stated that it wants to use all 
policy areas for its migration policy objec-
tives including mobility, energy, security, 
and digital policy. According to the EU 
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trade strategy (Trade4All), the synergies 
between trade policy and migration are also 
to be explicitly strengthened. So far, how-
ever, aspects of return policy have not been 
included in EU negotiations with third 
countries. It is conceivable, however, that 
the pressure on the Commission, which 
is responsible for trade agreements, will 
continue to increase. This could be linked 
to demands to include conditionality 
clauses in agreements linking trade prefer-
ences to cooperation on readmission policy. 
Such an approach would not only contra-
dict the World Trade Organization’s re-
quirement for equal treatment, but would 
also have strategic disadvantages. Such 
measures could undermine important 
efforts such as intensified trade relations 
and dialogue on an equal footing with 
African partners announced with the 
reorientation of the EU-Africa Strategy. 
This, in turn, could further strengthen 
China’s influence on the continent. 
Conclusions 
Experience with negative conditionality 
shows that the threat of punitive measures 
has occasionally generated more coopera-
tion on readmission. As a consequence, 
however, return rates have only risen tem-
porarily, with overall very small absolute 
figures. Not only is the effectiveness of such 
a policy in question. It also often thwarts 
more far-reaching objectives of European 
foreign and development policy. This is the 
case when the threat of sanctions jeopard-
ises partnership-based cooperation at eye 
level – partner countries reorient them-
selves as a result, and the EU therefore loses 
its ability to exert influence. Particularly 
against the background of the Covid-19 
pandemic, it is not advisable to cut develop-
ment cooperation funds to partner coun-
tries that are unwilling to cooperate. This 
would aggravate the negative consequences 
of the global recession and the declining re-
mittances on the living conditions in those 
countries. 
Instead of pursuing the idea of negative 
conditionality, the German government 
should, in accordance with its departmental 
approach, advocate for comprehensive co-
operation on migration policy during the 
German EU Council Presidency, based on 
a long-term and fair exchange of interests 
with third countries. This would also mean 
keeping an old promise and granting part-
ner countries more legal migration oppor-
tunities if they cooperate on return policy. 
At the same time, improved democratic 
control of external migration policy by the 
European Parliament is indispensable to 
ensure transparency and compliance with 
human rights standards. 
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